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CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RECIDIVISM-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WEST
VIRGINIA RECIDIVIST STATUTE
In 1949 Dewey Hart wrote a check for fifty dollars without
sufficient funds and was convicted of a felony. A second felony
conviction, interstate transportation of forged checks, followed in
1955. In 1968 Hart was convicted of perjury for falsely testifying
at his son's murder trial. As required by chapter sixty-one, article
eleven, section nineteen, of the West Virginia Code,1 the prosecu-
tion filed a recidivist information prior to Hart's sentencing for the
third felony conviction. Following jury determination that Hart
was the same person who had sustained two prior felony convic-
tions, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment as re-
quired by chapter sixty-one, article eleven, section eighteen, of the
West Virginia Code.2
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19 (1966) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney when he has knowl-
edge of former sentence or sentences to the penitentiary of any person
convicted of an offense punishable by confinement in the penitentiary to
give information thereof to the court immediately upon conviction and
before sentence. Said court shall, before expiration of the term at which
such person was convicted, cause such person or prisoner to be brought
before it, and upon an information filed by the prosecuting attorney
setting forth the records of conviction and sentence, or convictions and
sentences, as the case may be, and alleging the identity of the prisoner
with the person named in each, shall require the prisoner to say whether
he is the same person or not. If he says he is not, or remains silent, his
plea, or the fact of his silence, shall be entered of record, and a jury shall
be impanelled to inquire whether the prisoner is the same person men-
tioned in the several records. If the jury finds that he is not the same
person, he shall be sentenced upon the charge of which he was convicted
as provided by law; but if they find that he is the same, or after being
duly cautioned if he acknowledged in open court that he is the same
person, the court shall sentence him to such further confinement as is
prescribed by section eighteen [§ 61-11-18] of this article on a second or
third conviction as the case may be.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-18 (1966) provides:
When any person is convicted of an offense and is subject to confine-
ment in the penitentiary therefor, and it is determined, as provided in
section nineteen [§ 61-11-19] of this article, that such person had been
1
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Hart brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challeng-
ing the life sentence on the ground that the West Virginia recidivist
statute, 3 as applied in his case, violated the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution. He contended that the mandatory life sentence was
excessive and disproportionate to the offenses involved. Held, re-
versed and remanded. The mandatory life sentence imposed upon
a third time felony offender pursuant to the West Virginia recidiv-
ist statute was so disproportionate to the underlying offenses,
writing a fifty dollar check without sufficient funds, transporting
forged checks in the amount of one hundred forty dollars across
state lines, and perjury, as to be cruel and unusual punishment.
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
Prior to Hart, the West Virginia recidivist statutes had sur-
vived constitutional challenge on both due process and equal pro-
tection grounds.' The constitutional attack made against the stat-
before convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment in a penitentiary, the court shall, if the sentence to be imposed is
for a definite term of years, add five years to the time for which the person
is or would be otherwise sentenced. Whenever in such case the court
imposes an indeterminate sentence, five years shall be added to the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment otherwise provided for under such sentence.
When it is determined, as provided in section nineteen hereof, that
such person shall have been twice before convicted in the United States
of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the person shall
be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life.
I Hart's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied in the district court.
Thereafter, the prisoner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
where the decision was reversed and the case remanded with instructions.
The recidivist statutes applied to Hart were a part of the Virginia law
adopted by West Virginia upon becoming a separate state. Brown, West Virginia
Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. Rv. 30, 33 (1956). They provide for the
imposition of an additional sentence of five years upon the second felony conviction
and a life sentence following a third such conviction. West Virginia case law clearly
sets forth a three-fold justification for the existence of recidivist statutes. In State
v. Stout, 116 W. Va. 398, 402, 180 S.E. 443, 444 (1935), the court stated that "[tlhe
purpose of the [recidivist] statute is to permit trial courts to protect society from
habitual criminals by the imposition of more severe sentences than would be justi-
fied by the conviction for the offense under trial alone." (emphasis added). Dye v.
Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90, 103, 62 S.E.2d 681, 689 (1950), indicates that the legislature,
in enacting a habitual criminal statute, "intended it to serve as a warning to first
offenders and to afford a convict an opportunity to reform." Procedures for applying
the additional punishment provisions are found in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19
(1966). The habitual criminal accusation, once raised by an information filed by
[Vol. 77
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utes in Hart followed a trend set by other decisions that had invali-
dated established punishments because they were cruel and un-
usual.' The court's decision in Hart was influenced significantly by
the Supreme Court's decision of Furman v. Georgia' where in sepa-
the prosecuting attorney, requires a two-fold proof of identity of offender and of the
existence of prior convictions. Provision is made for the impanelling of a jury to
determine identity in the event the defendant either denies that he is the same
individual adjudged guilty of the prior offenses or stands silent on the matter. See
note 1 supra.
5 In State v. Graham, 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S.E. 1010 (1910), aff'd, 224 U.S. 616
(1912), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that application of habit-
ual criminal punishments did not constitute double jeopardy because the convict
is not held to answer for a crime for which he has already been convicted. Rather,
his status as a repeat offender is the ground upon which the additional punishment
is imposed. The United States Supreme Court upheld the West Virginia court's
decision, and further determined that the statutorily prescribed procedure did not
constitute a denial of due process:
It cannot be said that the prisoner was deprived of due process of law
because the question as to former conviction was passed upon separately.
While it is familiar practice to set forth in the indictment the fact of prior
conviction of another offense, and to submit to the jury the evidence upon
that issue together with that relating to the commission of the crime
which the indictment charges, still in its nature it is a distinct issue, and
it may appropriately be the subject of separate determination. Provision
for a separate, and subsequent, determination of his [the prisoner's]
identity with the former convict has not been regarded as a deprivation
of any fundamental right.
224 U.S. at 625.
In Peer v. Skeen, 108 F. Supp. 921, 922 (N.D.W. Va. 1952), the court, quoting
from U.S. ex rel Collins v. Claudy, 106 F. Supp. 367, 373 (W.D. Pa. 1952), deter-
mined that the recidivist scheme was "not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy
or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is stiffened penalty for the latest
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."
With regard to the propriety of the conviction-upon-information procedure, the
district court said: "An indictment as an habitual criminal is not necessary because
defendant is not on trial as an habitual criminal, but is sentenced to a heavy
penalty because he is one." 108 F. Supp. at 922.
In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), application of the West Virginia recidiv-
ist statute was held not to constitute denial of either due process or equal protec-
tion. Failure to prosecute all offenders under the statute was held to be justified
absent a showing of reasons other than reasonable selectivity or lack of knowledge
of prior convictions.
I The principal thrust of the cruel and unusual concept appears to be that of
prohibiting excessiveness. 'The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive
either in the bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted." O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (dissenting opinion). In Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), the Court recognized that the constitutional proscription
is a fluid concept that "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
3
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rate concurring opinions Justices Marshall and Brennan focused
on a proportionality theory of punishment analysis-an examina-
tion of the constitutionality of a given criminal sanction from the
perspective of its "excessiveness." Part of Justice Brennan's analy-
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958), supported this idea of an evolving concept with the statement that
"[tihe Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."
A number of cases have dealt with the problem of outlining the parameters of
"cruel and unusual." In Weems, the Court determined that a fifteen year sentence
imposed on an official of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands
for falsifying public documents was too severe. The Court reached this conclusion
by comparing the given punishment with punishments imposed for more violent
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands and with punishments lev-
ied in another jurisdiction, the American penal system. The fifteen year sanction
was found to be a more severe punishment than punishments imposed for more
violent crimes within the same jurisdiction; it had no counterpart in the American
system. The Court stated:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from
the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense.
217 U.S. at 366-67.
In State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952), the court stated
that:
Cruel and unusual punishments were originally regarded as referring to
such barbarous impositions as pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, drawing and quartering, and the like. But it is now generally
recognized that imprisonment for such a length of time as to be all out
of proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as to
shock the conscience of reasonable men, is cruel and unusual within the
meaning of the constitution.
The court in Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968) suggested
that a three-factor test be applied to determine if a given punmhment is cruel and
unusual: (1) determine whether a given punishment is of such character as to shock
the general conscience and violate the principles of fundamental fairness, in light
of developing concepts of elemental decency; (2) compare the offense and its pun-
ishment to determine if disproportionality exists; and (3) determine whether the
punishment exceeds that which would be necessary to accomplish the public intent
expressed by a given legislative act. 429 S.W.2d at 377-78. See also Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 335 (1970). In Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), a rapist's
failure to take or endanger the life of his victim was viewed as a mitigating factor
and prompted the court's refusal to apply the death penalty prescribed by statute.
Such consideration of the specific circumstances surrounding the commission of a
crime constitutes a significant step toward increased scrutiny in punishment appli-
cation. A further development of the decency test applied in prior cases occurred
in People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972), in which the court
recommended that the decency of a punishment be determined by comparing it to
4
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sis for determining whether a given punishment is cruel and
unusual was employed by the majority in Hart.7
The Hart court cited four objective factors as relevant to an
examination of Hart's sentence: (1) the nature of the offense; (2)
the legislative purpose behind the punishment; (3) a comparison
of the punishment with that which would have been inflicted in
other jurisdictions; and (4) a comparison of punishment for other
offenses within the same jurisdiction.'
With regard to the first factor, the court noted that none of
Hart's three convictions had involved crimes of violence or danger
to the person.' The opinion focused on the relatively trivial nature
of the three crimes and noted that the fifty dollar bad check offense
would have been a misdemeanor if the check had been a penny
that used for similar crimes in other jurisdictions. Two other important points made
by the court were that: (1) a given punishment may be so excessive as to shock the
conscience if it is applied without consideration of the offender's personality and
history; and (2) long or severe punishments have not been shown to serve the
legislative purpose of rehabilitating criminal offenders. Id. at 178-81, 194 N.W.2d
at 832-34. With regard to this latter point, the court noted that "experts on penology
and criminal corrections tend to be of the opinion that, except for extremely serious
crimes or unusually disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating offenders with
maximum effectiveness can best be reached by short sentences of less than five
years' imprisonment." Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833.
Two recent decisions that have employed the proportionality analysis utilized
in Hart were Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d
410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1 Justice Brennan outlined four factors for punishment analysis. First, a pun-
ishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
Second, a severe punishment must not be arbitrarily inflicted. Brennan recognized
that there is little danger of extremely severe punishments, such as the death
penalty, being widely applied. He argued that the more significant function of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause has been to protect against the arbitrary
imposition of such punishments. Third, a severe punishment must not be unaccept-
able to contemporary society. Brennan advocated the use of objective analysis
rather than the subjective "shocks the fundamental instincts of civilized man"
approach. He suggested that due consideration be given to the history of a given
punishment and its use in other jurisdictions. Fourth, a severe punishment must
not be excessive; it must be neither disproportionate to the crime nor fail to serve
the penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment. 408 U.S. at 269-
80 (concurring opinion). The Hart court used the third and fourth factors of
Brennan's analysis to reach the conclusion that the mandatory life sentence im-
posed by the West Virginia recidivist statute was cruel and unusual because it was
disproportionate to the offenses involved.
9 483 F.2d 136, 139-42 (4th Cir. 1973).
5
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less.'" The court admitted that perjury was a more serious offense
than the previous two offenses, but the moral dilemma that con-
fronted Hart at the time of this offense-the choice between "his
duty to tell the truth and family loyalty""-mitigated this offense.
The second factor, the legislative purpose behind the punish-
ment, was taken from Justice Brennan's opinion in Furman."5 Prior
West Virginia case law had established a three-fold justification for
the existence of recidivist statutes-isolation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation.' 3 In Hart, the court lambasted legislative use of the
"penultimate punishment" of life imprisonment to combat "petty
crime in America."" It emphasized the unreasonableness of plac-
ing one who stands guilty of offenses that "rank relatively low in
the hierarchy of crimes" behind bars for the remainder of his life
and pointed out that it was unlikely that one who has passed bad
checks will be reformed into a truthful man by experiencing such
an extreme punishment.'5 Other factors that contributed to the
unreasonableness of life imprisonment in this situation were the
already over-crowded condition of the penal institutions and the
financial burden imposed on the state by incarcerating an individ-
ual for life. 6 By employing Justice Brennan's logic in Furman
-where significantly milder punishment could be used to achieve
the purposes for which the stricter punishment was inflicted, the
stricter punishment was unnecessary and, hence, excessive' 7- the
" Id. at 141. In support of its position, the court cited Ralph v. Warden, 438
F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1970), which recognized that "there are rational gradations of
culpability that can be made on the basis of injury to the victim."
" 483 F.2d at 141. Under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-39 (1966), passing a bad
check for less than fifty dollars is punishable by confinement in the county jail
instead of the penitentiary.
12 483 F.2d at 140.
13 Id. at 141. Brennan favors the Court's consideration of whether there are less
severe punishments that would adequately serve the penal purpose. See note 7
supra.
" See note 3 supra.
'5 483 F.2d at 141.
z Id.
I? Recent studies have shown that the cost of prisoner care has increased appre-
ciably. It is estimated that construction of penal institutions requires an expendi-
ture of approximately $40,000 per bed. Added to this initial cost are the financial
burdens imposed by increased recidivism and prison riots. See Baer, Recidivism,
Discretion, and Deferred Prosecution, 29 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 141 (1974). The
House Select Crime Committee summarized the situation as follows: "American
taxpayers paid $1.5 billion to keep . . . men and women in prison. . . while being
victimized by crimes, eighty per cent of which were committed by former inmates."
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 36, col. 3.
[Vol. 77
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court determined that none of the legislative purposes behind a life
sentence would be served and that, therefore, such a sentence was
unnecessary."
The third consideration of the Hart court was a comparison
of the punishment imposed on defendant Hart. as a third felony
offender with the punishment that has normally been imposed on
a defendant in a similar situation in other jurisdictions. Examina-
tion of habitual offender provisions reveals that a mandatory life
sentence for a third felony conviction is prescribed in only three
other states, Indiana, Kentucky, and Texas." Two states provide
for discretionary application of a life sentence in such a situation
thereby allowing for consideration of the individual case and the
nature of the offenses involved." The court cited West Virginia's
recidivist scheme as one of the four most severe in the nation21 and
pointed out that had the statute allowed judicial discretion, Hart
would probably not have been given such a severe sentence.
2
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (concurring opinion). The fourth
factor applied by Justice Brennan in analyzing the constitutionality of a given
punishment focused on the excessiveness of the punishment in light of the purpose
or purposes for which it is imposed. The idea that the least severe punishment that
can be applied to achieve a penal purpose is constitutionally proper is derived from
the earlier case of Weems v. U. S., 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
11 483 F.2d at 141. The court stated that:
[A] sentence of life imprisonment, the most severe punishment avail-
able under West Virginia law, is unnecessary to accomplish the legislative
purpose to protect society from an individual who has committed three
wholly nonviolent crimes over a period of twenty years. Nor, except on
the theory that more is better, is it necessary to deter others. Ten years'
possible imprisonment for perjury is calculated to make one stop and
think-whether or not it does.
20 Id. An appendix to the opinion contains a survey of state recidivist provi-
sions. Id. at 143-44. This survey indicates that Washington also provides for a
mandatory life sentence after a third felony conviction. Its exclusion from the
majority opinion in Hart is unexplainable.
22 Kansas and New York provide for the discretionary imposition of a life
sentence after a third felony conviction. Alaska, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Vermont allow
for discretionary imposition after a fourth felony conviction. New Jersey might also
be included in this category; the only difference is that New Jersey specifies imposi-
tion after a fourth conviction of a high misdemeanor.
2 The court fails to elaborate on the three other jurisdictions it considers to
be most severe. Since Kentucky, Texas, and Indiana have a third felony offender
punishment which is the same as that in West Virginia, they are at least as severe.
Three other states have recidivist statutes which could be considered as severe.
Maine and Washington provide for a discretionary life sentence after a second
7
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Finally, the court looked at West Virginia's entire criminal
punishment system. Only three situations other than a third felony
mandate a life sentence.23 Even the second offense of a compara-
tively violent crime would merit only five additional years beyond
the prescribed punishment." One who has committed second de-
gree murder for the second time, for example, could get a maxi-
mum of twenty-three years (eighteen years for the offense itself
and five additional years under the recidivist statute), while Hart,
whose crimes posed no threat of violence, received a life sentence
merely because his third conviction was a felony.
After consideration of these relevant factors, the court con-
cluded that: (1) the mandatory life sentence imposed on Hart was
"constitutionally excessive"; (2) such sentence was likewise
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offenses he [Hart]
committed"; and (3) such sentence was "not necessary to achieve
any legitimate legislative purpose."
Judge Boreman took issue with the court's examination on an
individual case basis of the disproportionality created by an appli-
cation of the recidivist provisions. 6 He argued that the mandatory
nature of such provisions precluded case-by-case consideration,
and he further disagreed with the majority's subjective judgment
of the nature of Hart's crimes. From his perspective, it was im-
proper to employ such an analysis where the constitutionality of
clearly defined statutory provisions was in question.Y Judge Bore-
man's final criticism was that the reasoning employed by the ma-
jority afforded no standard or formula for applying this dis-
proportionality analysis to other cases. The Hart decision, in his
view, left a multitude of unanswered questions and offered no solu-
felony conviction. Virginia provides for a life sentence, likewise discretionary in its
application, after what is termed a second prison offense. See the appendix of the
opinion, 483 F.2d at 143-44.
2 483 F.2d at 142.
24 Id. A life sentence for first degree murder is mandatory. W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-2-2 (1966). A life sentence for rape is mandatory, except where the accused
pleads guilty or the jury recommends mercy. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-15 (1966).
In kidnapping, a life sentence is prescribed unless the victim is returned unharmed
or without ransom payment. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-14a (1966).
2 483 F.2d at 142.
2, Id. at 143.
2 Id. at 145 (dissenting opinion). Judge Boreman would have granted habeas
corpus relief solely on the ground that Hart's 1949 bad check conviction was invalid
because of denial of effective assistance of counsel.
[Vol. 77
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tion to other courts that will be faced with "a dilemma in every
case of recidivism."'
The Hart case represented the first successful challenge to the
West Virginia recidivist statutes.29 The legal reasoning on which it
was based evidenced a development in eighth amendment analysis
consistent with a judicial trend toward humanizing and equalizing
criminal punishment. The punishment in Hart was held unconsti-
tutional because it was disproportionate to the underlying offen-
ses."0 The Fourth Circuit similarly employed this proportionality
analysis when deciding the capital punishment case of Ralph v.
Warden,3 and it is reasonable to assume that Ralph was particu-
larly influential on the Hart decision. Ralph manifested a predis-
position to view a prescribed punishment as too severe to be ap-
plied in a situation where particluar circumstances are involved.
The Hart court, having already recognized in Ralph that mitigat-
ing facts are often involved in an individual criminal conviction,
was more willing to view Hart's particular situation as unique and
to scrutinize any over-the-board application of a prescribed pun-
ishment to him.
Proportionality analysis may be viewed within the context of
an even broader scheme of punishment analysis. The dissenting
opinion of Justice Goldberg in Rudolph v. Alabama" suggests the
development of a trend in punishment examination based on sub-
stantive due process. With such an approach, the consideration
becomes one of balancing the state's interest promoted by the
29 483 F.2d at 148 (dissenting opinion).
21 Id. at 149 (dissenting opinion).
30 See note 4 supra.
31 The proportionality analysis is a means employed by the court for justifying
its finding that a given punishment is excessive and, hence, cruel and unusual. This
type of analysis gained particular attention in cases dealing with the legality of
capital punishment. For a discussion of the significance of the proportionality
theory in the Hart decision, see Note, Criminal Procedure-Eighth Amendment
Proportionality Analysis In Its Infancy, 52 N.C.L. REv. 442 (1973).
- 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). The court rejected an application of the death
penalty for a rapist where the facts of the particular case showed that the victim's
life had not been taken or endangered. The court based its determination that the
death penalty was disproportionate to the underlying offenses upon two factors: (1)
most other jurisdictions, in keeping with a legislative trend toward abolishing the
death penalty, considered it too excessive for rape, and (2) when there was a statu-
tory provision for alternative punishments, the choice of the death penalty was
deemed anomalous when compared to the many rapists sent to prison. Id. at 793.
The court cited infrequent imposition of the punishment as an indication that it
was both excessive and arbitrarily inflicted. Id. at 792.
9
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criminal sanction against the infringement of the individual inter-
ests of the person punished. The state's interest versus individual
interest approach provides for a focusing on the particular circum-
stances and needs of the offender himself. It is a step beyond the
proportionality analysis employed in Hart and similar cases that
have looked more to the nature of the offense rather than to the
nature of the individual offender. When determining a particular
punishment's constitutionality, the balancing process of substan-
tive due process offers myriad possibilities for increasing the hu-
manization of punishment.
Another possible consideration is that of examining the ration-
ale behind a legislative choice of a particular punishment to fit a
given crime. This approach embodies a potential that is relevant
to the use of recidivist schemes in general and to their use in West
Virginia in particular. Three theoretical bases for the application
of recidivist statutes have been cited-isolation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation." The application of the recidivist statutes in West
Virginia has been justified on all three of these grounds. Imposition
of habitual criminal sanctions in every case where they ought to
be applied would be consistent with their mandatory language and
should, ideally, serve some of the purposes specified. As a practical
matter, however, use of the recidivist statutes in West Virginia is
sporadic and discretionary and governed largely by the conveni-
ence or inconvenience of gathering evidence sufficient to apply it
to individual cases.u Absent consistent use in all pertinent cases,
the West Virginia recidivist scheme ought logically to be attacked
on the ground that it is not, in fact, serving any rational legislative
purpose. Such an attack could be approached from two perspec-
tives: (1) the three purposes for which recidivist statutes are em-
375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion). Goldberg outlined the following
questions as relevant to punishment analysis under the eighth amendment: (1) does
the given punishment violate evolving standards of decency? (2) does the taking of
human life to protect a value other than human life (death penalty imposed where
rape victim's life not endangered) constitute a punishment disproportionate to the
offense, therefore being excessive? (3) could the purposes of the more severe punish-
ment be served by a less severe punishment? Id. at 889-90.
It is noteworthy that a decision against use of the death penalty in rape cases
where the victim's life was not endangered was eventually made in Ralph v. War-
den, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), and that the abrogation of the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was based on a method of punishment
analysis that incorporated all of the considerations suggested by Goldberg. See note
7 supra.
3 See note 3 supra.
[Vol. 77
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ployed are irrational in themselves, because recidivist statutes
don't really produce such results;3 or (2) the purposes underlying
the statutes are rational, but the actual method of implementing
the statutes is so irregular and subjective as to be irrational. In
view of the fact that the West Virginia recidivist statutes have
withstood prior constitutional challenges, the possibilities for at-
tacking these statutes using this substantive due process approach
warrant serious consideration.38
Legislative revision of the statutes, which has been proposed
See Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30, 40,
46-47 (1956). A survey of judges and prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia con-
ducted in 1956 indicated that the majority viewed the State's recidivist scheme as
too severe. This severity, as well as the difficulty of proving prior convictions,
prompted many prosecutors to ignore the statute's mandatory provisions. A letter
from one prosecutor indicated that:
[Tihe necessity of producing the several fingerprint records of a defen-
dant for the purpose of identifying him as a defendant in a prior felony
and of vouching those records by the proper witnesses frequently presents
a considerable expense, time expenditure, and practical difficulty which
make the average West Virginia prosecuting attorney inclined to forego
the whole matter, particularly when the prior offenses are committed
outside the State of West Virginia.
Id. at 46.
11 Empirical studies of criminal punishment indicate that recidivist statutes
do not serve the three purposes of isolation, deterrence, and rehabilitation. It has
been shown that:
habitual offender laws are undesirable as a matter of public policy for the
reason that they serve to isolate from society only a group of unfortunate
inadequates [persons with social adjustment problems who are chronic
alcoholics, drug addicts, or who engage in persistent minor offenses].
Neither rigorous study nor casual observation provide any evidence for
the proposition that violent, or organized, or professional thieves, who
may truly be said to represent a serious danger to the social order, are in
any way affected by the operation of these laws.
Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BuFFALO L. REV. 99 (1971).
That recidivist statutes do not serve as deterrents has been shown by studies which
indicate that length of imprisonment does not curb an offender's future commission
of crimes. See L. OPLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, & TREATMENT 88-89 (1973). A study
of the effectiveness of correctional programs in California reveals that, rather than
rehabilitating offenders, incarceration often causes them to deteriorate. The report
indicated that:
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the act of incarcerating a
person at all will impair whatever potential he has for crime-free future
adjustment and that, regardless of which "treatments" are administered
while he is in prison, the longer he is kept there the more likely will he
deteriorate and the more likely is it that he will recidivate. In any event,
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but not yet accomplished,37 will probably only change the criteria
for applying such statutes ignoring the constitutional legitimacy of
the recidivist scheme itself. A change in the method of implement-
ing a system that has inherent constitutional defects will serve only
as a temporary resolution for a basic difficulty.
Cynthia L. Turco
it seems almost certain that releasing men from prison earlier than is now
customary in California would not increase recidivism.
Robison, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67,
71-72 (1971).
31 Telephone conversation with Ms. Janice Evans, Secretary to Mr. Richard
Frum, Special Assistant to Governor Arch A. Moore, Jr., September 27, 1974. The
revision of the West Virginia recidivist scheme was a part of the Governor's call
submitted at a special session of the Legislature in June, 1974. Little information
is available concerning who was originally responsible for submitting this item to
the Governor for inclusion in the call. The matter was referred to the Governor by
the Office of the Attorney General. Apparently, the item died in committee and
never reached the floor for vote.
[Vol. 77
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